Piercing the Corporate Veil in Ohio: The Need for a New Standard following Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., Case Comment by Sweeney, Margaret A.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2009
Piercing the Corporate Veil in Ohio: The Need for
a New Standard following Dombroski v. Wellpoint,
Inc., Case Comment
Margaret A. Sweeney
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Case Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Ohio: The Need for a New Standard following Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc., 57 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 951 (2009)
 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN OHIO:                           
THE NEED FOR A NEW STANDARD FOLLOWING               
DOMBROSKI V. WELLPOINT, INC. 
MARGARET A. SWEENEY∗ 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 951 
 II. BACKGROUND...................................................................... 953 
 A. A Brief History of the Doctrine of Piercing 
  the Corporate Veil ....................................................... 953 
B. The Evolution of Ohio’s Doctrine of Piercing 
 the Corporate Veil ....................................................... 954 
 III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: DOMBROSKI V.  
  WELLPOINT, INC................................................................... 958 
 A. Facts of the Case ......................................................... 958 
 B. Procedural History ...................................................... 959 
 IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S MODIFICATION OF THE  
  BELVEDERE TEST AND ITS LIKELIHOOD TO CAUSE  
  FURTHER CONFLICTS AMONG APPELLATE DISTRICTS ......... 964 
 A. The Court’s Modification of the Belvedere Test 
  Will Cause Further Conflicts Among the Appellate  
  Districts........................................................................ 964 
 B. The Supreme Court of Ohio Should Set Forth a New 
Standard that Allows Piercing in Cases of “Fraud or 
Similarly Wrongful Conduct”...................................... 968 
 V. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 970 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio had its third attempt to clarify Ohio’s 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil—and it failed.  Piercing the corporate veil is 
one of the most criticized and litigated issues of corporate law,1 and it has been 
                                                                 
∗ J.D. expected 2010, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; 
B.A. Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.  Thank you to Brenda Sweet for her thoughtful 
suggestion of this topic.  And a special thank you to Tony Kresser for his love and laughter 
that made this project, and all of law school, more enjoyable; and a most sincere thank you to 
my parents, Emily and Patrick Sweeney, for their never-ending love, support, and inspiration. 
1 See Lee C. Hodge & Andrew B. Sachs, Piercing the Mist: Bringing the Thompson Study 
into the 1990s, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 341 (2008) (citing Robert B. Thompson, 
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991)) 
(finding similar results to the Thompson study); Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in 
Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 637, 641 (2005). 
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described as something that is “rare, severe, and unprincipled.”2  The doctrine is 
meant to hold companies’ shareholders accountable for harms committed behind the 
veil of the corporate form.  But piercing is not as easy as it sounds.  Generally, 
piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine that should be used only in limited 
circumstances.  What these limited circumstances are, however, is widely disputed 
among courts throughout the country.  
This dispute is no less prevalent in Ohio, where, until recently, the state courts of 
appeals were in conflict as to what circumstances warranted piercing the corporate 
veil.  Some appellate districts held that only “fraud or an illegal act” on the part of 
the corporation would allow a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil, and others held 
that an “inequitable or unjust act” would suffice.  In Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc.,3 
the Supreme Court of Ohio modified the Belvedere test, which describes when a 
plaintiff may pierce the corporate veil.  Specifically, the Court added that a 
company’s “fraud, . . . illegal act, or . . . similarly unlawful act” may justify piercing 
the corporate veil.4  With this modification, the Supreme Court of Ohio hoped to 
resolve the confusion among the appellate districts.  
The Court’s modification, however, fails to articulate a workable standard for 
lower courts.  The Supreme Court of Ohio has previously addressed the issue as to 
what type of misconduct warrants piercing the corporate veil, and both of its 
attempts to do so in North v. Higbee Co.5 and in Belvedere Condominium Unit 
Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos.6 have conflicted the appellate districts.7  The 
court’s previous phrases—“fraud” and “fraud or an illegal act”—have already 
conflicted the appellate courts, and its new language in Dombroski is no less 
confusing.  
Because the Supreme Court of Ohio’s modification of the Belvedere test is 
merely cosmetic and not substantive, it will not successfully resolve the conflict 
among the appellate districts.  Instead, the Court has caused a new cycle of 
uncertainty and inevitable conflict among the appellate courts as to the meaning of 
“similarly unlawful acts.”  To prevent another split over the same issue of what 
conduct permits piercing the corporate veil, the Supreme Court of Ohio should set 
forth a clear standard in which “fraud or similarly wrongful acts” will warrant 
piercing.  This standard would be consistent with the purposes and traditions of the 
doctrine in Ohio.   
Part II.A of this Comment will discuss the history and purpose of the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil.  Part II.B will describe the evolution of this doctrine 
within Ohio from the development of the Belvedere three-part test, through the 
conflict among the courts of appeals that gave rise to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 
                                                                 
2 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985). 
3 Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538 (Ohio 2008). 
4 Id. at 545 (emphasis added). 
5 North v. Higbee Co., 3 N.E.2d 391 (Ohio 1936). 
6 Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio 
1993). 
7 See infra Part II.B. 
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latest attempt at clarification.  Part III will discuss the facts and procedural history of 
Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc.  Part IV.A will show how the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 
modification of the Belvedere test will inevitably cause another conflict among the 
courts of appeals.  Part IV.B will explain that the Supreme Court of Ohio must adopt 
a clear standard that permits piercing for “fraud or similarly wrongful acts” to avoid 
another conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  A Brief History of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil 
A fundamental concept of corporate law is that a corporation exists as a legal 
entity that is separate from its owners and operators.8  Because a corporation is 
legally independent, its shareholders enjoy the benefit of limited liability.9  Under 
the principle of limited liability, owners, directors, and shareholders are not liable for 
the obligations and liabilities of the corporation.10  Additionally, shareholders are 
liable only up to the amount of their investments in the corporatio 11n.    
                                                                
There are times, however, when limited liability would allow a corporation to get 
away with exceptionally wrongful behavior.  When this occurs, the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil serves as a type of “safety valve” to allow plaintiffs to 
disregard the corporate entity and hold its shareholders and owners personally 
liable.12  Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine, and it is applied in very 
limited circumstances.13  Although there is no clear test for when a court will allow a 
plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil, there are generally three substantive factors that 
plaintiffs must show:14 first, that the corporation does not have a separate existence 
from its shareholders; second, that the corporation, through its shareholders, is 
engaged in some type of misconduct; and third, that the misconduct caused the 
plaintiff’s asserted injury.15   
Because the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is a product of the common 
law,16 many courts have developed their own articulation of these factors.17  As a 
 
8 Strasser, supra note 1, at 640.  
9 Hodge & Sachs, supra note 1, at 341. 
10 See Strasser, supra note 1, at 640. 
11 See Hodge & Sachs, supra note 1, at 341. 
12 Strasser, supra note 1, at 640 (“Yet these rigid legal rules of limited liability needed a 
safety valve to escape unacceptable results and supervise limited liability.  In corporate law, 
the familiar doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ is the traditional safety valve and the one 
most commonly used . . . .”). 
13 Hodge & Sachs, supra note 1, at 344. 
14 See id. at 341-42, 344 (noting that “courts have never enunciated a clear test for when 
they will pierce the corporate veil”); see also Strasser, supra note 1, at 640 (“Whatever the 
difference in their formulation, the core inquiry in each case emphasizes the same two 
substantive factors, plus causation of the complained of injury.”). 
15 Strasser, supra note 1, at 640-41. 
16 Hodge & Sachs, supra note 1, at 346-47. 
17 See Strasser, supra note 1, at 641-42. 
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result, many courts have inconsistently applied the doctrine.18  These inconsistencies 
have made the doctrine ripe for criticism.19  Several critics argue that the doctrine 
has become so abstract that judicial decisions regarding piercing have become 
largely discretionary.20  This is especially true when it comes to evaluating the 
second factor—whether the corporation’s misconduct is sufficient to pierce the 
corporate veil.21  Specifically, courts are divided over whether a corporation’s 
misconduct must constitute fraud or whether other types of unjust or inequitable 
conduct are sufficient to pierce the veil.22  Moreover, courts that allow piercing 
where the corporation’s conduct was something other than fraud are further divided 
as to what types of misconduct will suffice.23  When courts do articulate standards 
for the misconduct, the standards are generally vague and fail to provide guidance to 
future cases.24  This was the conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals, and this 
conflict gave rise to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s latest attempt to set piercing 
standards in Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc.  
                                                                
B.  The Evolution of Ohio’s Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Ohio has a well-established recognition of the principle of limited shareholder 
liability,25 as well as a settled tradition of allowing plaintiffs to pierce the corporate 
 
18 Id. (quoting Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 481 
(2001) (stating that the doctrine is “uncertain[ ]” and “lack[s] . . . predictability”)). 
19 See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2; Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing 
Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853 (1997); Douglas C. Michael, To Know A Veil, 26 J. CORP. 
L. 41 (2000); Strasser, supra note 1. 
20 Strasser, supra note 1, at 641 (“Traditional veil piercing has been extensively criticized 
for at least the last fifty years and the criticism continues unabated.  The core charge is that the 
doctrine is expressed at such a high level of abstraction that decisions in individual cases are in 
fact highly discretionary with the courts.”). 
21 See generally id. 
22 See id. at 640-41. 
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 641.  This leads some scholars to argue that courts are heavily influenced by the 
facts of the particular case rather than any judicially imposed standards.  Kurt A. Strasser is 
one critic of piercing the corporate veil who argues that courts have too much discretion when 
it comes to implementing the doctrine:   
[T]he standards articulated in the cases are quite diverse, giving little general guidance 
for future cases, and the results are heavily influenced by the specific facts in 
particular cases.  Examples of wrongful conduct are as varied as human experience 
itself.  When necessary to reach what the court views as the correct result, some courts 
are willing to treat simple commission of a tort, breach of a contract, or insolvency as 
sufficiently wrongful conduct.  In effect, these decisions make the requirement of 
finding wrongful conduct a formality.  However, in many other cases, courts treat this 
requirement as an insuperable barrier to relief. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
25 OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 3 (“Dues from private corporations shall be secured by such 
means as may be prescribed by law, but in no case shall any stockholder be individually liable 
otherwise than for the unpaid stock owned by him or her.”). 
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veil.26  This tradition, however, has not been smooth and steady.  Rather, the 
doctrine’s evolution has seen many splits and shifts.  
North v. Higbee Co. was Ohio’s first attempt to articulate a standard for when 
courts should permit a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil.27  There, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio held that piercing the corporate veil “requires that the proof . . . show 
not only an excessive control over the subsidiary but the actual exercise of that 
control in such a manner as to defraud or wrong the complainant.”28  Under this 
standard, the Court found that the defendant parent company, Higbee Company, was 
not liable for the payments on a rent contract made by its subsidiary, the Higbee 
Realty Company.29   Because the parent company had not misled or wronged the 
plaintiff, the Court found that the plaintiff could not pierce the corporate veil and 
hold the parent company accountable for the rental debt of the subsidiary.30   
More than fifty years after North, the Supreme Court of Ohio attempted to further 
clarify what type of misconduct warranted piercing the corporate veil.  In Belvedere 
Condominium Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., the Court interpreted North as 
requiring fraud before piercing could occur.31  The Court determined that North’s 
standard required two elements: “(1) that the corporation was formed in order to 
perpetrate a fraud, and (2) that the shareholder’s control of the corporation was 
exercised to defraud the party.”32  Although the Supreme Court of Ohio applied this 
new interpretation of North, the lower court in Belvedere, did not apply North at 
                                                                 
26 See State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, para. one of the 
syllabus (Ohio 1892) (“That a corporation is a legal entity, apart from the natural persons who 
compose it, is a mere fiction, introduced for its convenience in the transaction of its business, 
and of those who do business with it; but, like every other fiction of the law, when urged to an 
intent and purpose not within its reason and policy, may be disregarded.”). 
27 North v. Higbee Co., 3 N.E.2d 391, 392-93 (Ohio 1936) (stating that both parties relied 
on Michigan’s articulation of disregarding the corporate entity, presumably because Ohio had 
not stated a clear position or standard on the doctrine). 
28 Id. at 398 (citing FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 
(1931)) (accepting the trial court’s articulation of the standard).  
29 Id. at 399. 
30 Id. 
31 Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1085 
(Ohio 1993).  The court went on to cite the syllabus of North to state the standard to pierce the 
corporate veil: 
The separate corporate entities of a parent and subsidiary corporation will not be 
disregarded and the parent corporation will not be held liable for the acts and 
obligations of its subsidiary corporation, notwithstanding the facts that the latter was 
controlled by the parent . . . in the absence of proof that the subsidiary was formed for 
the purpose of perpetrating a fraud and that domination of the parent corporation 
over its subsidiary was exercised in such manner as to defraud complainant. 
Id.; see also North, 3 N.E.2d at 398 (“Furthermore, upon the question whether the Higbee 
Company, under the doctrine laid down by Mr. Powell, wronged these certificate holders, we 
must judge the transaction by the financial situation which existed in the fall of 1925 . . . .”).  
32 See Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1085. 
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all.33  Instead, it followed the standard set out in Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. General 
Products Co.34 from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.35 
In Bucyrus-Erie, the Sixth Circuit recognized that Ohio had not yet set out a clear 
test for piercing the corporate veil.36  In light of this doctrinal vacuum, the court laid 
out a three-part test derived from the Second Circuit.37  The Sixth Circuit stated that: 
[T]he corporate fiction should be disregarded when: (1) domination and 
control over the corporation by those to be held liable is so complete that 
the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its own; (2) that 
domination and control was used to commit fraud or wrong or other 
dishonest or unjust act, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the 
plaintiff from such control and wrong.38     
In Bucyrus-Erie, the Defendant, who was the majority shareholder of General 
Products, argued that the jury should have been instructed to determine whether he 
used the corporation to perpetrate a fraud.39  The Sixth Circuit, however, held that 
the instruction was not needed because fraud was not a required element for piercing 
the corporate vei 40 l.
                                                                
On appeal in Belvedere, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the lower court’s 
decision to apply the Sixth Circuit’s standard from Bucyrus-Erie.41  After finding 
that “the Sixth Circuit’s approach to piercing the corporate veil strikes the correct 
balance between the principle of limited shareholder liability and the reality that the 
corporate fiction is sometimes used by shareholders to protect themselves from 
liability for their own misdeeds,”42 the Supreme Court of Ohio articulated its new 
standard: 
 
33 Id. at 1086. 
34 Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Gen. Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1981). 
35 Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086. 
36 Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418 (“No precise test for disregarding the corporate fiction 
has been articulated by the courts, each case being regarded as ‘sui generis’ and decidable on 
its own facts.” (citing DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 
681 (4th Cir. 1976))). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), 
aff’d 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also Berger v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 
991, 995 (5th Cir. 1972). 
39 Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418. 
40 Id. at 419 (“Though fraud is a frequent ground for application of the alter ego doctrine, 
it is not essential.  The courts will disregard the corporate fiction when its retention would 
produce injustice or inequitable consequences.” (citing State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard 
Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, at para. one of the syllabus (Ohio 1892); Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 
349, 361 (1944); Nat’l Marine Serv. v. C. J. Thibodeaux & Co., 501 F.2d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 
1974); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th 
Cir. 1973))). 
41 Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086. 
42 Id.  
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[T]he corporate form may be disregarded and individual shareholders held 
liable for corporate misdeeds when (1) control over the corporation by 
those to be held liable was so complete that the corporation has no 
separate mind, will, or existence of its own, (2) control over the 
corporation by those to be held liable was exercised in such a manner as to 
commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to disregard the 
corporate entity, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff from 
such control and wrong.43 
Even though the Supreme Court of Ohio said that it was adopting the Sixth Circuit’s 
standard, its second factor differed slightly from that of the Sixth Circuit.44  While 
the Sixth Circuit required that the corporation “commit fraud or wrong or other 
dishonest or unjust act,”45 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that the corporation 
must “commit fraud or an illegal act.”46  Under this standard, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio found that the Defendant corporation owner could not be held personally liable 
because there was no evidence to show that he used his control to defraud the 
plaintiff.47  Under the Sixth Circuit’s standard, however, the Court may have allowed 
piercing if it determined that the defendant’s acts were “dishonest or unjust,” even if 
those acts did not qualify as fraudulent.48  Although the Court did not state that it 
changed the Sixth Circuit’s standard, or that there was even any difference between 
the two standards,49 its new articulation began a serious conflict among Ohio’s 
appellate courts. 
Confusion arose within Ohio’s courts of appeals because the Supreme Court of 
Ohio claimed to adopt the Sixth Circuit standard but, in fact, changed the language 
of the second factor.  Several courts of appeals interpreted Belvedere’s articulation of 
the second factor to mean that a plaintiff could pierce the corporate veil when the 
defendant’s control over the corporation was done “‘to commit a fraud, illegal, or 
other unjust or inequitable act.’”50  Other districts, however, interpreted Belvedere 
more strictly and allowed piercing only in cases of a fraud or an illegal act.51  This 
                                                                 
43 Id. 
44 See id. 
45 Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418. 
46 Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 (emphasis added). 
47 Id. (“We hold that the Association did not introduce sufficient evidence to pierce 
RERC’s corporate veil and reach Roark individually.  The Association did not introduce any 
evidence that Roark used his control over RERC in such a manner as to defraud the 
Association. . . . The evidence cited by the court of appeals below clearly show[ed] that Roark 
did exercise control over RERC, but mere control over a corporation is not in itself a . . . basis 
for shareholder liability.”). 
48 See Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418. 
49 See, e.g., Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1085-87. 
50 See Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 543-44 (Ohio 2008) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Wiencek v. Atcole Co., 671 N.E.2d 1339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)). 
51 See Collum v. Perlman, No. L-98-1291, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1938, at *9 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Apr. 30, 1999). 
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conflict among the districts led the Supreme Court of Ohio to address the issue in 
Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc.52  The distinction between the two interpretations is 
important, because, as the Supreme Court of Ohio notes, allowing piercing in cases 
of “unjust or inequitable conduct” significantly increases plaintiffs’ opportunities to 
pierce.53  Because piercing the corporate veil is meant to apply in very limited 
circumstances, the Supreme Court of Ohio certified the conflict in Dombroski to 
attempt to strike a balance between the limited applicability of the doctrine and the 
occasional need to hold shareholders liable.54 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE: DOMBROSKI V. WELLPOINT, INC. 
A.  Facts of the Case 
For most of her life, Kimberly Dombroski suffered from significant hearing loss 
in both of her ears, which rendered her completely deaf.55  In 2000, Ms. Dombroski’s 
doctor recommended that she receive a cochlear implant to restore hearing to her left 
ear.56  After five years with the singular implant, Ms. Dombroski’s doctor advised 
that she receive a second implant for her right ear.57  However, following her 
doctor’s request for authorization to implant the second device, Ms. Dombroski’s 
insurance company denied her coverage and said that the use of two cochlear 
implants was considered “investigational” and, therefore, not covered under her 
plan.58 
At this time, Ms. Dombroski contracted with Community Insurance Company for 
her health insurance.59  Anthem UM Services, Inc., as an affiliate of Community 
Insurance, administered Ms. Dombroski’s policy along with Anthem Insurance 
Company.60  WellPoint, Inc. owns one hundred percent of the stock of each of these 
three corporations.61  After unsuccessfully appealing the denial with Anthem UM, 
                                                                 
52 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543-44. 
53 Id. at 544 (“Adding unjust or inequitable conduct to the second prong of the Belevedere 
test significantly increases the number of cases in which a plaintiff could pierce the corporate 
veil.”). 
54 Id. at 544-45. 
55 Id. at 540. 
56 Id.  The Supreme Court of Ohio defined a cochlear implant as “a small electronic device 
that is placed inside a deaf person’s ear and provides him or her with a sense of sound.”  Id. at 
540 n.1.  The court went on to note that such devices are approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration and are ninety percent successful.  Id. 
57 Id. at 540. 
58 Id. at 540-41 (noting that Ms. Dombroski’s first implant was covered by a separate 
insurance company that was not party to her suit and whose coverage was not at issue here).   
59 Id. at 540. 
60 Id. at 540-41. 
61 Id. at 541. 
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Ms. Dombroski filed suit against all four corporations claiming breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, and the tort of insurer bad faith.62 
In support of her claims, Ms. Dombroski alleged that WellPoint, Inc. established 
“corporate medical policies” through Anthem Insurance.63  One of these policies 
stated that the implantation of two cochlear implants is an investigational 
procedure.64  Because of this policy, Anthem Insurance and Anthem UM denied 
coverage for the second cochlear implant.65  It was the administration of this specific 
policy, Ms. Dombroski alleged, that constituted insurer bad faith.66 
B.  Procedural History 
In response to Ms. Dombroski’s complaint, WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem 
Insurance filed motions to dismiss.67  Both corporations contended that Ms. 
Dombroski failed to allege a basis for piercing the corporate veil that would enable 
her to claim liability beyond Anthem UM and Community Insurance.68  The trial 
court in Belmont County granted the companies’69 motions to dismiss, and Ms. 
Dombroski appealed to the Seventh Appellate District of the Court of Appeals for 
Ohio. 
The Seventh District Court of Appeals addressed the specific issue of whether 
Ms. Dombroski could pierce the corporate veil of Community Insurance such that 
she could hold WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem Insurance liable for her bad faith claim.70  
                                                                 
62 Id.  The promissory estoppel and breach of contract claims are not at issue here. 
63 Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
64 Id.  
65 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 541; see also Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 228-29.   
66 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 541.  Ohio law imposes a duty of good faith on insurers 
regarding the “processing and payment of valid claims of [the] insured.”  Gillette v. Estate of 
Gillette, 837 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (citing Beever v. Cincinnati Life Ins. 
Co., Nos. 02AP-543, 02AP-544, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2663, at *20 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 
2003)).  The insured may sue the insurer for bad faith if “‘[a]n insurer fails to exercise good 
faith in the processing of a claim of its insured where its refusal to pay the claim is not 
predicated upon circumstances that furnish reasonable justification therefor [sic].’”  Id. 
(quoting Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, para. one of the syllabus (Ohio 
1994)). 
67 Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 229.  
68 Id.  Additionally, both corporations claimed that Ms. Dombroski had failed to state a 
claim for which relief could be granted because she was not in privity of contract with either 
of them; therefore, the companies argued, she could not assert, nor prevail, on the breach of 
good faith claim based on the insurance contract with Community Insurance and Anthem UM.  
Id.  
69 The court dismissed the complaint against WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem Insurance, but 
Community Insurance and Anthem UM remained parties to the suit.  Id. 
70 The court also decided the issue of whether Ms. Dombroski’s bad faith claim was 
actionable, but that issue is not pertinent to the corporate veil discussion because the court 
determined that the claim was valid.  Id. 
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The court reviewed Ms. Dombroski’s complaint using Belvedere’s three-part test71 to 
see if she had sufficiently pled facts that would show her “desire to proceed under 
the theory” of piercing the corporate veil.72 
The court quickly found that Ms. Dombroski’s complaint adequately addressed 
the first and third prongs of the Belvedere test.73  The second prong, however, gave 
the court more pause.  The Seventh District Court of Appeals broadly interpreted the 
second prong of Belvedere and said that fraud or illegal acts are not strictly required 
to pierce the corporate veil.74  Instead, the court held that a corporation’s unjust or 
inequitable acts are sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.75  Under this standard, the 
court found that Ms. Dombroski’s complaint alleging bad faith and breach of 
contract pled sufficient unjust or inequitable acts to meet the second prong of 
Belvedere.76  After finding that the complaint also met the third prong of Belvedere, 
the court determined that Ms. Dombroski gave fair notice of an attempt to pierce the 
corporate veil and held that the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint was in error.77 
                                                                 
71 Id. at 230.  The Supreme Court of Ohio specifically noted that the Belvedere test is the 
correct standard when attempting to pierce the veil to reach an individual shareholders or 
another corporation.  Id. (“[T]he Belvedere test is equally applicable to piercing a corporation 
to reach an individual shareholder or owner as it is to piercing a corporation to reach another 
corporation.”) (citing Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 
1075, 1085 (Ohio 1993)).  
72 The court found that:  
A party seeking to pierce the corporate veil is not required to relate the specific 
intention in the complaint in order to proceed under the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil. . . . All that is required is that the complaint contain sufficient 
information to indicate a desire to proceed under the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil. 
Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 230-31 (citing Geier v. Nat’l GG Indus., Inc., No. 98-L-172, 1999 
Ohio App. LEXIS 6263, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1999); Dalicandro v. Marrison Rd. 
Dev. Co., Nos. 00AP-619, 00AP-656, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1765, at *20 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Apr. 17, 2001)). 
73 Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 231-33 (“Both parties agree that the complaint clearly alleges 
that WellPoint controls its subsidiaries to the point that they have no separate mind, will or 
existence of their own.  The first prong of Belvedere is undisputedly established. . . . In the 
complaint, she alleges that she has suffered physical loss, pecuniary loss, emotional distress, 
impaired earning capacity, and lessened likelihood of a successful working implantation of a 
future right side cochlear implant.  She alleges that these injuries have resulted from the 
‘control and wrong’ by WellPoint through its subsidiaries due to the corporate medical policy.  
This is sufficient to meet the third prong of Belvedere.”). 
74 Id. at 232-33. 
75 Id. at 233. 
76 Id. (“The failure of the duty to act in good faith in handling claims constitutes an unjust 
or inequitable act for purposes of pleading piercing the corporate veil.”). 
77 Id.  The court also went on to analyze whether, as Ms. Dombroski asserted, contractual 
privity needed to be relaxed in order for her to pursue her claim against WellPoint, Inc. and 
Anthem Insurance.  The court ultimately concluded that privity is not required to assert a 
claim against a parent company if the corporate veil is pierced.  Id. at 234-35.  However, the 
court’s reasoning is not pertinent to the appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio and, therefore, is 
not discussed here.   
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WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem Insurance filed a notice to certify a conflict between 
the Seventh District Court of Appeals and the Sixth District Court of Appeals.78  At 
this point, the Sixth District interpreted the second prong of Belvedere as limiting 
piercing to situations where the corporation committed fraud or an illegal act.79  
Because the Seventh District found that Ms. Dombroski could pierce the corporate 
veil by showing that WellPoint, Inc.’s acts were unjust or inequitable, the Seventh 
District certified the conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio.80  The specific issue 
before the Supreme Court of Ohio was: 
Does the second prong of Belvedere, which states that the corporate veil 
can be pierced when control of the corporation “was exercised in such a 
manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to 
disregard the corporate entity,” also allow the corporate veil to be pierced 
in cases where control was exercised to commit unjust or inequitable acts 
that do not rise to the level of fraud or an illegal act?81 
The Supreme Court of Ohio began its analysis with the Belvedere test.82  First, the 
court accepted Ms. Dombroski’s claim that WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem Insurance 
controlled its subsidiaries that administered her policy in such a way that those 
subsidiaries did not have their own minds, wills, or existences.83  The Court then 
recognized that it needed to focus on the second prong of the Belvedere test.84 
The Court recognized that the central issue was whether to adopt a broad or strict 
construction of the second prong of Belvedere.  It noted that the Seventh District’s 
interpretation aimed to reconcile Belvedere’s limited wording with the original 
purpose of the piercing doctrine.85  The Supreme Court of Ohio noted that this 
reconciliation allows for unjust or inequitable acts because piercing the corporate 
                                                                 
78 The Sixth District decisions that the defendants asserted were in conflict with the 
Seventh District were Collum v. Perlman, No. L-98-1291, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1938 (Ohio 
Ct. App., Lucas County Apr. 30, 1999) and Widlar v. Young, No. L-05-1184, 2006 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 777 (Ohio Ct. App., Lucas County Feb. 24, 2006). 
79 Collum, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1938, at *3; see also Widlar, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 
777, at *51-53.   
80 Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio 2008).  The Ohio Constitution 
allows for lower courts to certify conflicts to the state supreme court in certain circumstances: 
Whenever the judges of a court of appeals finds that a judgment upon which they have 
agreed is in conflict with a judgment pronounced upon the same question by another 
court of appeals of the state, the judges shall certify the record of the case to the 
supreme court for review and final determination.   
OHIO CONST. art IV, § 3(b)(4). 
81 Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 116 Ohio St. 3d 1472 (2008) (order certifying a conflict).  
82 Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ohio 2008); see also supra p. 957 
(discussing the Belvadere test). 
83 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
962 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:951 
veil is meant to be an equitable doctrine.86  It further explained that a broader 
interpretation of Belvedere would allow the doctrine to operate more equitably.87  
Although this interpretation may be more equitable, the Court noted that a broader 
interpretation would greatly expand plaintiffs’ opportunities to pierce the corporate 
veil.88  
While the Seventh District’s interpretation may be too broad, the Supreme Court 
of Ohio noted that the Sixth District’s strict construction was too restrictive.89  The 
Court explained that under the Sixth District’s interpretation, piercing is strictly 
limited to situations where a corporation commits fraud or an illegal act.90  Under 
this interpretation, Ms. Dombroski’s complaint would fail because she did not allege 
that the Defendants had committed fraud or an illegal act.91  Although piercing 
should occur only in the most exceptional circumstances, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
determined that Belvedere’s language was too limited to address the “wide variety of 
egregious shareholder misdeeds that may occur.”92 
In an effort to address the needs of plaintiffs who are injured in such a manner, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio modified its Belvedere test.93  The court held, “[T]o 
fulfill the second prong of the Belvedere test for piercing the corporate veil, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant shareholder exercised control over the 
corporation in such a manner as to commit fraud, an illegal act, or a similarly 
unlawful act.”94  The Court further specified that courts should allow plaintiffs to 
pierce the corporate veil only when the shareholder defendant has engaged in 
extreme misconduct.95 
Finally, the Court held that the tort of insurer bad faith does not constitute the 
type of “exceptional wrong” for which piercing the corporate veil was meant to 
                                                                 
86 Id. (“Because the plain language of the second prong of the Belvedere test imperfectly 
applies to this view, these courts have modified the requirement of ‘fraud or an illegal act’ to 
allow for additional forms of misconduct.”). 
87 Id. at 544-45.  
88 Id. at 544 (“Adding unjust or inequitable conduct to the second prong of the Belvedere 
test significantly increases the number of cases in which a plaintiff could pierce the corporate 
veil.”). 
89 Id. at 545 (“[W]e are convinced that our pronouncement in Belvedere is too limited to 
protect other potential parties from the wide variety of egregious shareholder misdeeds that 
may occur.”). 
90 Id. at 544 (citing Collum v. Perlman, No. L-98-1291, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1938 
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1999)). 
91 See also id. at 544 n.2 (noting that in her brief to the Supreme Court of Ohio, Ms. 
Dombroski argued that the insurer bad faith tort could constitute an illegal act, but because this 
issue was not certified to the Court, the Court will not consider it). 
92 Id. at 545. 
93 Id. at 544-45. 
94 Id. at 545 (emphasis added) (noting further that this does not affect the other two prongs 
of the test).  
95 Id. 
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remedy.96  The Court recognized that Ms. Dombroski’s bad faith claim would be 
successful under a standard that allowed piercing for “unjust or inequitable acts,” as 
the Seventh District found.97  Under the Court’s new modification, however, the 
Court determined that Ms. Dombroski’s claim against WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem 
Insurance must fail.98 
Justice Pfeifer was the only justice to dissent from the majority opinion.99  He 
first notes that Belvedere developed from a line of cases that meant to include unjust 
or inequitable acts, as the majority of Ohio’s appellate districts have interpreted.100  
He argues that Bucyrus-Erie’s standard—fraud or wrong or other dishonest or unjust 
act—is indicative of this intent.101  Even though Belvedere’s language differs slightly 
from that in Bucyrus-Erie, Justice Pfeifer argues that the Supreme Court of Ohio 
merely abbreviated the language to “fraud or an illegal act.”102  Because the phrase is 
merely an abbreviation of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ test, he argues that 
Belvedere meant to include unjust or inequitable acts as well.103   
Justice Pfeifer’s dissent also notes that even though most Ohio districts have 
adopted the broader construction of the second prong, it still remains very difficult to 
pierce the corporate veil.104  Finally, Justice Pfeifer argues that the majority’s 
modification of the Belvedere test did not clarify the second prong; rather, the 
additional language “muddied the waters” of when to pierce the corporate veil.105  
Even though Justice Pfeifer disagrees with the majority’s modification of Belvedere, 
he says that Ms. Dombroski’s insurer bad faith action still qualifies as a “similarly 
unlawful act” for which the majority’s standard would allow piercing.106  He argues 
that insurer bad faith is not a “simple negligent performance of contractual 
duties;”107 what would otherwise be a contract claim, he notes, is “transformed into a 
tort action because of the unreasonableness of the insurer’s behavior.”108  For this 
reason, he concludes, Ms. Dombroski’s allegations were sufficient to pierce the 
corporate veil, even under the majority’s modification of Belvedere.109   
                                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Id. (“Insurer bad faith is a straightforward tort, a basic example of unjust conduct.”). 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 546. 
100 Id. at 546 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 546-47.  
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IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S MODIFICATION OF THE BELVEDERE TEST AND ITS 
LIKELIHOOD TO CAUSE FURTHER CONFLICTS AMONG APPELLATE DISTRICTS 
In Dombroski, the Supreme Court of Ohio attempted to make a uniform standard 
for Ohio courts to determine when it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil in an 
effort to resolve the conflict among the appellate courts.  The Court’s attempt, 
however, will not result in a resolution of the conflict but will cause conflicts over 
the same issue.  Ohio’s appellate districts have previously conflicted over this 
issue—once following North v. Higbee Co. and again following Belvedere.  Both of 
these conflicts followed Supreme Court of Ohio attempts to clarify what types of 
misconduct would allow a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil.110  Dombroski v. 
WellPoint, Inc. is the Supreme Court of Ohio’s third attempt to resolve this conflict.  
However, because the Supreme Court of Ohio has added language but no substance 
to the Belvedere test, the appellate districts will surely split along the same lines in 
future cases.   
If the Supreme Court of Ohio really wants to prevent future conflicts among the 
appellate districts, it must set out a new standard that allows piercing when the 
corporation has engaged in “fraud or similarly wrongful conduct.”  This standard is 
consistent with the evolution of Ohio’s doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, and it 
would accomplish the Court’s goal of balancing the importance of limited 
shareholder liability and shareholder accountability.  Moreover, this standard would 
accommodate the conflicting standards of the Sixth and Seventh Districts and, in 
turn, prevent future conflicts among the appellate courts. 
A.  The Court’s Modification of the Belvedere Test Will Cause Further Conflicts 
Among the Appellate Districts 
Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc. is the Supreme Court of Ohio’s third attempt to 
resolve the question of whether a corporation’s unjust or inequitable acts are 
sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.111  This attempt, however, is just as confusing 
as the Court’s earlier attempts—both of which split the appellate districts over what 
types of corporate misconduct warranted piercing.  The Court’s third attempt in 
Dombroski merely adds to the confusing language with another vague phrase—
“similarly unlawful acts.”  This phrase is just as vague as the Court’s previous 
language and will similarly cause conflicts among Ohio’s courts of appeals.   
The Court’s first attempt to address what types of misconduct warrant piercing 
was in North v. Higbee Co.112  In North, the issue on appeal was similar to that in 
Dombroski:  
Can the court disregard the fiction of separate corporate entity of the 
subsidiary corporation when the facts disclose that a wrong and an 
injustice has been perpetrated upon innocent third persons in the absence 
                                                                 
110 See supra Part II.B. 
111 See generally Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 
1075 (Ohio 1993); North v. Higbee Co., 3 N.E.2d 391 (Ohio 1936). 
112 See supra p. 1057. 
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of fraud or illegality and hold the parent company liable for the 
obligations of its subsidiary?113 
After North, the courts of appeals eventually conflicted over what type of 
misconduct warranted piercing.  Despite North’s seemingly clear standard that fraud 
was required,114 some appellate districts chose to follow North, and others chose to 
follow a broader standard set forth in the Sixth Circuit.115   
Similar to North, in Dombroski, the Supreme Court of Ohio has set out a new 
articulation of its piercing standard.  Unlike North, however, the Court’s standard is 
not as clear.  In North, the Court clearly stated that fraud would be the touchstone for 
piercing the corporate veil.116  In Dombroski, however, the Court stated that 
“similarly unlawful act[s]” would allow a plaintiff to pierce the veil.117  If the 
appellate districts split when the Supreme Court of Ohio clearly stated that fraud—a 
discernable and definable harm118—was required for piercing, it is foreseeable that 
the Court’s additional vague language in Dombroski will split the districts again.  
Because the Supreme Court of Ohio failed to define what type of conduct could be 
classified119 as a “similarly unlawful act,” the modified Belvedere test is left to the 
interpretation of the historically conflicted appellate districts.120 
This first conflict among the appellate districts may have occurred because of the 
interjection of the Sixth Circuit’s articulation of piercing standards in Bucyrus-Erie 
                                                                 
113 North, 3 N.E.2d at 392 (recognizing this as the issue presented before the lower court). 
114 Id. at syllabus (“The separate corporate entities of a parent and subsidiary corporation 
will not be disregarded and the parent corporation will not be held liable for the acts and 
obligations of its subsidiary corporation, notwithstanding the facts that the latter was 
controlled by the parent through its stock ownership, and that the officers and directors of the 
parent corporation were likewise officers and directors of the subsidiary, in the absence of 
proof that the subsidiary was formed for the purpose of perpetuating a fraud and that 
domination by the parent corporation over its subsidiary was exercised in such manner as to 
defraud the complainant.”). 
115 See Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 n.8.  This split also occurred in part because of 
Bucyrus-Erie, which interpreted Ohio law as allowing unjust or inequitable acts.  Bucyrus-
Erie, 643 F.2d at 419.  
116 See supra note 31. 
117 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545. 
118 See Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ohio 1987) (“The 
elements of an action in actual fraud are: (a) a representation or, where there is a duty to 
disclose, concealment of a fact, (b) which is material to the transaction at hand, (c) made 
falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to 
whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred, (d) with the intent of misleading 
another into relying upon it, (e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment, 
and (f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.”) (citing Burr v. Stark City Bd. 
of Comm’rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, para. two of the syllabus (Ohio 1986)).   
119 The Court did make clear that insurer bad faith claims would be excluded under its 
standard.  Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545 (“Insurer bad faith is a straightforward tort, a basic 
example of unjust conduct; it does not represent the type of exceptional wrong that piercing is 
designed to remedy.”). 
120 See supra Part II.B. 
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instead of an interpretation of the Court’s language in North.  Even so, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio’s attempt to resolve this conflict in Belvedere with a new articulation 
of the standard proved just as futile as its previous attempt in North.  Belvedere 
Condominium Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos. was the Supreme Court of 
Ohio’s second attempt to clarify what type of corporate misconduct warranted 
piercing the corporate veil.121  In Belvedere, the court adopted the Sixth Circuit’s 
standard and held that piercing required “fraud or an illegal act” on the part of the 
corporation.122  This attempt at clarification failed, and the courts of appeals split 
again into those that required solely fraud or illegal acts and those that allowed 
unjust or inequitable acts.123  This conflict was different than the split that followed 
North, as this conflict was the product of a difference of interpretation between the 
appellate districts124 rather than the districts simply adopting one test over another.125  
Because the districts interpreted Belvedere’s specific language—“fraud or an illegal 
act”—in two different ways, there is nothing to show that Dombroski’s additional 
language of “similarly unlawful acts” will prevent that from happening again.  If the 
districts have previously split over the interpretation of “fraud or an illegal act,” it is 
clearly foreseeable that the same split will occur when the modified test merely adds 
a synonym for the disputed term.126 
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s language in Dombroski will likely agitate the 
appellate districts’ predisposition to splitting over this issue.  In Dombroski, the 
Court found that the appellate districts that allowed unjust or inequitable acts were 
too broad in their interpretations of Belvedere.127  The Court’s modification of 
                                                                 
121 Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 n.8 (“As a result of Bucyrus-Erie, two irreconcilable 
lines of cases have developed in the lower Ohio courts.  Some Ohio courts of appeals have 
followed North in requiring that fraud in formation must be established. . . .  Other courts of 
appeals, however, have relied on Bucyrus-Erie and held that a finding of fraud in formation is 
not necessary.” (citations omitted)). 
122 Id. at 1086.  The Supreme Court of Ohio claimed to be adopting the Sixth Circuit 
standard over the North standard, but its language abbreviates what the Sixth Circuit requires.  
Compare id. with Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418.  
123 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543-44 (“The courts of appeals have interpreted the phrase 
‘fraud or an illegal act’ in two different ways.”). 
124 See Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543. 
125 See supra Part II.B. 
126 See also Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 547 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  The only dissenting 
justice, Justice Pfeifer, also makes note of the abstraction of the additional language: 
The majority believes that it expands on the Belvedere element of a “fraud or an illegal 
act” by including the redundancy “or a similarly unlawful act.”  Thus, not only may an 
“illegal act” satisfy the second element of the Belvedere test, but so will an act that is 
similarly unlawful to an illegal act.  The new language seems to be pulled from the air.  
Is there a notable distinction between an “unlawful” and an “illegal” act?  Not that the 
majority identifies.  The words appear to be two ways of saying the same thing.  
Potato, potahto, illegal, unlawful—let’s call the whole thing off. 
Id. 
127 See id. at 544-45 (“Were we to allow piercing every time a corporation under the 
complete control of a shareholder committed an unjust or inequitable act, virtually every close 
corporation could be pierced when sued, as nearly every lawsuit sets forth a form of unjust or 
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Belvedere in Dombroski, however, does nothing to limit this broad interpretation 
because “unlawful” is a common synonym for “illegal.128  Because “fraud” is a term 
whose definition is not up for interpretation,129 the lower courts’ split arises from its 
interpretation of the phrase “illegal acts.”  Merely adding a synonym for “illegal” to 
language that has proven to be vague130 and will only perpetuate the confusion 
among the courts.  Moreover, an “unlawful act” is considered to be “[c]onduct that is 
not authorized by law” or “a violation of a civil or criminal law.”131  Even though the 
Supreme Court of Ohio indicated that it did not want its modification to allow 
piercing in all civil actions,132 its language, in fact, does just that.  
Although the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the broad interpretations of 
Belvedere were improper, it also found that strict adherence to Belvedere’s language 
of “fraud or an illegal act” was too limited.133  The Court modified Belvedere’s 
language hoping to strike a balance between the concept of limited shareholder 
liability and the occasional need to pierce the corporate veil for “specific egregious 
acts.”134  Adding “similarly unlawful acts” to the Belvedere test, however, does 
nothing to clarify what those “specific egregious acts” are; all it says is that the 
misconduct is not limited to fraud or illegal acts.  It seems as if the Court attempted 
to take the districts’ two conflicting standards—“fraud or an illegal act” and 
“inequitable or unjust acts”—and come out somewhere in the middle.  The additional 
language, however, is more expansive in practice than the Court argues.   
At least one appellate district is already expansively applying Dombroski.  In 
RCO International Corp. v. Clevenger,135 the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging 
breach of contract and intent to pierce the corporate veil.136  The Tenth District Court 
of Appeals, which had previously allowed piercing in cases of unjust conduct,137 
held that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.138  
The court cited Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc. saying, “While demonstrating . . . fraud 
                                                          
inequitable action and close corporations are by definition controlled by an individual or small 
group of shareholders.”). 
128 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (8th ed. 2004). 
129 See supra note 118 (listing the elements of fraud in Ohio). 
130 This language is proven to be vague because it has been subjected to different 
interpretations among the courts.  
131 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1574. 
132 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  
133 See Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 544. 
134 See id. at 544, 545 (“In view of the reality that shareholders could seriously misuse the 
corporate form and evade personal liability under the second prong as presently worded, we 
find it necessary to modify the second prong of the Belvedere test to allow for piercing in the 
event that egregious wrongs are committed by shareholders.”). 
135 RCO Int’l Corp. v. Clevenger, 904 N.E.2d 941 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
136 Id. at 942. 
137 Swayne v. Beebles Invs., 891 N.E.2d 1216, 1228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (interpreting 
Belvedere to allow piercing when the corporation’s conduct was unjust). 
138 RCO, 904 N.E.2d at 943. 
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is one way to meet the second prong of the Belvedere test, a plaintiff may also meet 
the same by demonstrating ‘an illegal act, or a similarly unlawful act.’”139  Despite 
the Supreme Court of Ohio’s intent in Dombroski to avoid piercing every time a 
corporation is sued, the Tenth District has continued to apply its unjust conduct 
standard through Dombroski’s “similarly unlawful acts” language.140  Like RCO 
International, other appellate districts will likely revert back to their pre-Dombroski 
standards because the Supreme Court of Ohio’s language is too vague to give any 
true guidance.  Because Dombroski’s language is too vague to prevent another split 
among the appellate districts, the Supreme Court of Ohio should set out a new 
standard for what types of corporate misconduct will allow a plaintiff to pierce the 
veil.   
B.  The Supreme Court of Ohio Should Set Forth a New Standard that Allows 
Piercing in Cases of “Fraud or Similarly Wrongful Conduct” 
The Supreme Court of Ohio must set a new standard for when plaintiffs may 
pierce the corporate veil because the modification of Belvedere in Dombroski is no 
clearer than the previous language that had already split the appellate districts.141  
Instead, the Supreme Court of Ohio should adopt a new standard that allows piercing 
in cases of “fraud or similarly wrongful conduct.”  This standard is consistent with 
the foundational principles of the piercing doctrine and accomplishes the Supreme 
Court of Ohio’s goal of balancing the importance of limited liability and the 
occasional need to pierce the corporate veil.  Moreover, this standard would 
accommodate the conflicting standards of the Sixth and Seventh Districts and, 
therefore, prevent future conflicts among other appellate courts. 
Modifying the Belvedere test to allow for wrongful acts in addition to fraud is 
consistent with the fundamental principles of the piercing doctrine and Ohio’s 
piercing jurisprudence.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “wrongful” as 
“[c]haracterized by unfairness or injustice . . . [c]ontrary to law; unlawful . . . .”142  
Under this definition, courts would be permitted to pierce the veil when a 
corporation has engaged in unjust conduct, similar to the Seventh District 
standard.143  Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine for plaintiffs to 
ensure fair dealing between shareholders and third parties.144  It is meant to balance 
the importance of the principle of limited shareholder liability and the occasional 
need to hold shareholders accountable.145  To accomplish this balance, the majority 
                                                                 
139 Id. at 944 (quoting Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538 (Ohio 2008)). 
140 Id. 
141 See supra Part II.A. 
142 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1644. 
143 See supra Part II.B. 
144 See Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543; see also Michael, supra note 19, at 55. 
145 See Strasser, supra note 1, at 640. 
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of courts have said that fraud is not the only misconduct that will warrant piercing 
the corpo 146rate veil.    
                                                                
Incorporating the phrase “similarly wrongful acts” into the Ohio’s piercing 
standard will expand the standard beyond the strict limits of fraud, as the Supreme 
Court of Ohio desired in Dombroski.147  This standard, however, would not allow 
piercing in all cases of injustice, as the Supreme Court of Ohio feared the Seventh 
District’s standard would.148  Because the standard requires that the wrongful 
conduct be similar to fraud, courts would be limited to piercing in cases where the 
injustice or unfairness—as the definition includes—is as serious or similarly serious 
to the act of fraud.149  This would prevent, as the Supreme Court of Ohio intended, 
the application of the doctrine to every suit brought against a corporation.   
This standard provides more guidance than Dombroski’s “similarly unlawful 
acts” standard because it is more restrictive.  In the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 
modification, “similarly unlawful act[s]” follows “illegal act[s],”150 but it does not 
serve as a limitation on that phrase because “unlawful” is a common synonym for 
“illegal.”151  Because the definition of “wrongful” incorporates illegality and 
injustice, the phrase qualifies and limits itself.  Therefore, if a plaintiff seeks to 
pierce the corporate veil based on an unjust or inequitable act under this standard, 
that plaintiff would have to show that those acts are considered “similarly wrongful.”  
This would require the plaintiff to show not only that the wrongful conduct is 
similarly serious to fraud but that the injustice complained of is illegal as well. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio should allow piercing in cases of fraud or 
similarly wrongful conduct because this standard is consistent with the roots of 
Ohio’s piercing jurisprudence.  In North, the Supreme Court of Ohio laid out a 
standard that required fraud before the corporate veil could be pierced.152  Later, in 
Belvedere, the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
standard and thereby expanded the piercing doctrine to cases of “fraud or an illegal 
act.”153  This articulation, however, was an abridgement of the Sixth Circuit’s 
 
146 Id. at 640-41 (“Must the wrongful conduct rise to the level of common law fraud?  
While New Mexico and a few other jurisdictions appear to say yes, the prevailing view is that 
common law fraud is not required to support piercing.”). 
147 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545 (“[H]aving reviewed the various tests for piercing the 
corporate veil developed by other authorities, we are convinced that our pronouncement in 
Belvedere is too limited to protect other potential parties from the wide variety of egregious 
shareholder misdeeds that may occur.”). 
148 Id. at 544-45.  
149 See id. at 545 (noting that piercing the corporate veil should not allow shareholders to 
be insulated from liability when their acts “are as objectionable as fraud or illegality”). 
150 Id. 
151 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
152 North v. Higbee Co., 3 N.E.2d 391, 398 (Ohio 1936). 
153 Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1086 
(Ohio 1993) (“We feel the Sixth Circuit’s approach to piercing the corporate veil strikes the 
correct balance between the principle of limited shareholder liability and the reality that the 
corporate fiction is sometimes used by shareholders to protect themselves from liability for 
their own misdeeds.”); see also supra pp. 1058-59. 
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standard that allowed for piercing in cases of “fraud or wrong or other dishonest or 
unjust act.”154  In adopting this standard, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed that the 
Sixth Circuit standard correctly balanced the interests of limited liability and justice 
for injured plaintiffs.155  Furthermore, in Dombroski, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
recognized that piercing is required for a “wide variety of egregious shareholder 
misdeeds,” including those that were not fraud or explicitly illegal.156  Adopting the 
standard that allows piercing in cases of fraud or similarly wrongful acts would 
further the Supreme Court of Ohio’s historical intent to allow injustices and 
inequities to pierce the corporate veil when they are “as objectionable as fraud or 
illegality.”157  The Supreme Court of Ohio should adopt a standard where plaintiffs 
may pierce the corporate veil when the corporation has committed fraud or similarly 
wrongful acts because this standard is consistent with fundamentals of the doctrine 
and its evolution in Ohio.    
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s modification of the Belvedere test in Dombroski v. 
WellPoint, Inc. is unclear, inconsistent, and another failed attempt to resolve the 
conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals.  Because the Court has promulgated yet 
another confusing standard for what conduct will allow plaintiffs to pierce the 
corporate veil, Ohio’s courts of appeals are likely to conflict, once again, over this 
issue.   
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil works as a check on the established 
corporate law principle of limited shareholder liability.  Piercing allows injured 
plaintiffs to hold shareholders liable for their misconduct despite the general rule that 
shareholders are not personally liable for the debts of the corporation.  It is an 
equitable doctrine that is based in common law and has no consistent standard 
throughout the courts.  This inconsistency is especially true among Ohio’s courts, 
which have previously conflicted over its piercing standards.  The Supreme Court of 
Ohio has attempted to resolve this division in North and in Belvedere.  These 
attempts, however, have proved futile and have only caused further splits among the 
districts.   
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s latest attempt in Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc. is 
equally futile because its modification of Belvedere test is merely cosmetic.  Its 
additional language of “similarly unlawful acts” is likely to cause yet another 
conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals as to what types of corporate misconduct 
warrant piercing the veil.  Because the appellate districts conflicted over this issue 
following previous attempts at resolution, and will likely split again following 
Dombroski, the Supreme Court of Ohio should set out a different standard.  To 
prevent another conflict in the lower courts, the Supreme Court of Ohio should adopt 
a standard in which fraud or similarly wrongful conduct would allow plaintiffs to 
                                                                 
154 See supra pp. 1059.  
155 See Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086. 
156 Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545. 
157 Id. (“Limiting piercing to cases of fraud or illegal acts protects the established principle 
of limited liability, but it insulates shareholders when they abuse the corporate form to commit 
acts that are as objectionable as fraud or illegality.”). 
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pierce the corporate veil.  This standard is preferable to the standard set out in 
Dombroski because it is more consistent with the purpose of the piercing doctrine, 
and it accomplishes the Supreme Court of Ohio’s goal of balancing the importance 
of limited liability and the occasional need to hold shareholders liable.  
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